Will Saudi Arabia run out of money? : “they talk the talk, but can they walk the walk?” by Mundal, Bjørnar & Waaler, Frederik
 
 
Will Saudi Arabia run out of 
money? 
“They talk the talk, but can they walk the walk?” 
Bjørnar Mundal & Frederik Waaler 
Supervisor: Carsten Bienz 
Master Thesis in Finance 
NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis was written as a part of the Master of Science in Economics and Business 
Administration at NHH. Please note that neither the institution nor the examiners are 
responsible − through the approval of this thesis − for the theories and methods used, or 
results and conclusions drawn in this work. 
 
Norwegian School of Economics  
Bergen, Fall 2015 
 
  
2 
Abstract 
We examine when and if Saudi Arabia run out of money in order to predict if Saudi Arabia 
will change their oil policy due to the low oil price we are facing today. This is done by 
running different static analyses, time series analysis and an analysis on the effects of cutting 
production based on elasticity of supply.    
We find that Saudi Arabia run out of money if they continue without financial and strategic 
adjustments. However, our findings show that other analysts overestimate when Saudi 
Arabia run out of money, since they do not account for return on their foreign reserves. 
Furthermore, we find that Saudi Arabia will decrease the possibility of running out of money 
as long as they introduce a stricter budget policy. Lastly, we find that Saudi Arabia has 
something to gain from reducing their production. However, exclusively focusing on 
production cuts will not solve the initial problem with running out of money. Therefore, we 
find that Saudi Arabia will have their primary focus on adjusting expenditures, and 
production cuts will only be used as a secondary measure.  
We conclude that Saudi Arabia will not run out of money as they will adjust their 
expenditures and tighten their budget policies. We also believe that Saudi Arabia will try to 
delay the usage of production cuts as long as possible. Our findings indicate that the over-
supply of oil will continue and that we will observe a persisting low oil price. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent months, analysts worldwide have tried to predict when Saudi Arabia will run out 
of money, due to today’s low oil prices. All the analyses predict that Saudi Arabia will run 
out of money within the next five years, and it has been speculated that Saudi Arabia will 
need to change their oil policy. However, we believe their predictions are wrong. 
The drastic fall in oil prices has affected the world economy. Countries that import oil 
benefits from the fall in oil prices, but countries with large dependency of oil face higher 
unemployment rates and significantly drop in revenues. For instance, the unemployment rate 
in Norway has risen to 4.6% in August 2015, up with 1.3% since June 2014. Governments 
and people affected by this are hoping for a quick recovery for the oil prices, but the question 
is when and if this will happen.  
Since June 2014, the Brent Oil price has fallen from USD114 to approximately USD44 in 
the middle of November. There are various reasons for the reduction in oil price, whereas 
supply and demand had a significant role. However, supply factors explains most of the 
drop. There has been an increased supply from US production, which have reduced their 
imports from 9 million barrels a day to 5 million barrels a day (OPEC, 2015). In addition, 
Saudi Arabia has actively chosen to maintain their production levels to protect their market 
shares, and there is uncertainty over OPEC future production quotas. This combined with 
lower oil-demand and lowered growth expectations, has led to a drop in oil prices.  
Since the drop in oil prices is primarily caused by over-supply of oil, we have decided to 
analyse Saudi Arabia´s situation. Saudi Arabia is the main participant in OPEC, and a lot of 
attention is given to the kingdom, as they to great extent can, and have historically affected 
the global oil market. The kingdom is the largest producer and exporter of oil, and they have 
the largest proven oil reserves in the world. In 2014, their reserves were 266.6bn. barrels of 
oil. This is 48.5 times the reserves controlled by Norway and 7.3 times the reserves 
controlled by USA.  
Saudi Arabia is known for having a low marginal cost of producing oil, and many believe 
that they have no problem with the current oil prices. However, oil generates 80 – 90% of 
their total revenues, and their breakeven is therefore higher if you include their state budgets. 
The implication of this is that Saudi Arabia is losing money with today’s oil price. During 
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the first half of 2015 they withdrew USD73 bn. from their foreign reserves (Kerr, Financial 
Times, 2015). Saudi Arabia is currently in possession of large foreign reserves, and they can 
tolerate budget deficits for a period. However, the question is how long time it will take 
before they run out of money. We define running out of money as the time when net 
financial assets equals zero. This is of high interest, as this will give an indication on how 
Saudi Arabia will respond to the low oil price. A situation where Saudi Arabia risk running 
out of money increases the possibility of a strategic change in oil policy, such as a 
production cut. This will reduce the over-supply of oil and increase the price, which leads to 
an increased revenue for Saudi Arabia. 
This thesis may give a vital answer regarding the future of the oil market. An indication that 
Saudi Arabia, together with OPEC, will reduce their production will lead to an increase in 
the oil price. This can be a crucial development for a so far ailing oil price, and can bring the 
oil price back to historical high levels. The implications of this is increased revenues and a 
more stable economy with lower unemployment and better future prospects for the oil 
exporting countries. On the other hand, if Saudi Arabia leave the market to itself, affected 
governments, businesses and individuals will have to adjust to today’s situation and prepare 
for persisting low oil prices.  
Analysis done on the topic find different timelines on when Saudi Arabia will run out of 
money. IMF project that the kingdom will run out of money within five years if they keep 
doing what they are doing now. Another analysis done by CNBC find that Saudi Arabia will 
run out of money in under three years. Lastly, Trond Omdal at Pareto predicts that they will 
run out of money in the beginning of 2021. All the analyses assume no debt build-up, that 
deficit only draw on the reserve assets, current crude oil production and no change in macro-
economic factors. We question that these analyses do not account for future return on their 
current foreign assets, and that they underestimate Saudi Arabia´s ability to adjust their 
expenditures. Therefore, we believe that their predictions are incorrect. They overestimate 
the likelihood of Saudi Arabia running out of money and the time when they do so.  
We find that including expected return to the foreign reserves pushes the time when Saudi 
Arabia run out of money. We find that Saudi Arabia will run out of money somewhere 
between the beginning of 2020 and the beginning of 2027, if they make no financial or 
strategic adjustments, and continue as they have done in the past. However, we find that they 
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have both the opportunity and the ability to do the adjustments required, in order to prevent 
them from running out of money. 
Based on our findings we conclude that Saudi Arabia will not run out of money. They will 
acknowledge a persistent low oil price, adjust their expenditures relatively to their revenues 
and tighten their budget policies. Saudi Arabia has the opportunity to cut their production 
and may benefit from this. However, we believe Saudi Arabia will try to delay this for as 
long as possible as part of their long term strategy, and avoid subsidizing high cost oil 
producers such as American shale oil. As an effect of this, we will continue to observe over-
supply of oil, as it is unlikely that Saudi Arabia will change their oil production. Therefore, 
governments, businesses and individuals affected by the low oil price, have to adjust to 
today’s situation and prepare for a persisting low oil price. 
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2. Theory 
2.1 Saudi Arabia  
2.1.1 Saudi Arabia and oil 
Saudi Arabia is the world’s largest producer and exporter of oil. In 2014, the kingdom 
produced 9.7 million barrels of oil per day, accounting for approximately 13% of the world 
production (OPEC, 2015). Figure 1 shows a graph of world production in percentage. The 
Saudi Arabian government has also stated that they will try to increase their production 
capacity up to 12 million barrels of oil per day (OPEC, 2015). In addition to being the largest 
producer and exporter of oil, Saudi Arabia is one of few producers that have spare capacity 
that can be used to balance the markets in short term. They are also the only country with an 
official policy to maintain spare capacity (Fattouh & Sen, The Oxford Institute For Energy 
Studies, 2015).  
 
Figure 1: % of world oil production for different producers and OPEC (OPEC, 
2015) 
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Saudi Arabia exports a large fraction of their production. You can see in the graph below 
that since the beginning of the 90s their export has stabilized between 2000 and 2500 billion 
barrels per year.  
 
Figure 2: Annual Oil production and Export, million barrels (Ministry of 
Petroleum and Mineral Resources, 2015) 
In addition to being the world’s biggest oil producer, Saudi Arabia control approximately 
17.9% of the world’s proven crude oil reserves. This is the biggest oil reserve controlled by a 
country in the world. In 2014, their proven crude oil reserves were 266.6bn. barrels. This is 
48.5 times the reserves controlled by Norway and 7.3 times the reserves controlled by USA 
(OPEC, 2015). 
All of the oil production in Saudi Arabia is located onshore. As an effect of this, their 
marginal cost of producing oil is low, especially compared to the other countries. In 2014, 
their marginal cost of producing oil was estimated to USD3 per barrel. This is significantly 
lower than for instance US shale oil production, where the marginal cost of producing oil 
was USD73 in 2014. The same also applies if you compare to other production methods and 
countries. You can find a comprehensive list in the appendix.  
Their domestic consumption is also a big part of the Saudi Arabian oil production. Figure 3 
shows that the kingdom has experienced big economic growth since 1980, with GDP 
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increasing from USD145 bn. in 1980 to USD746 bn. 2014. This substantial increase in GDP 
has led to an increase in domestic consumption of oil and other refined products, from 695 
b/d in 1980 to 4156 b/d in 2014 (SAMA, 2015).  
 
Figure 3: Growth in GDP measured in USD million (IMF, 2015) 
A large portion of Saudi Arabia’s revenues come from oil. Figure 4 shows oil revenues as a 
fraction of total revenues. As we can see, oil revenues have since 1990 made up 78% – 93% 
of Saudi Arabia´s total revenues. This has varied since the beginning of the 1970s, and the 
past ten years’ oil revenues have been stable at around 84 – 93%.  (SAMA, 2015). 
 
Figure 4: Oil revenues as fraction of total revenues (SAMA, 2015) 
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It is interesting to look at how the kingdom´s expenditures have developed together with the 
development in revenues, as shown in figure 5. The government expenditures have increased 
as their revenues have increased. It seems to be a strong correlation between their 
expenditures and revenues.  
 
Figure 5: Development in revenues and expenditures (SAMA, 2015) 
Figure 6 illustrates actual vs. budgeted revenue. We can see that they have exceeded their 
expectations the past 15 years, which implies a conservative budgeting.  
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Figure 6: Actual vs budgeted revenue in million USD (SAMA, 2015) 
Figure 7 illustrates actual vs budgeted expenses. We observe that they have exceeded their 
expenditures budgets the past 15 years.   
 
Figure 7: Actual vs budgeted expenses in million USD (SAMA, 2015) 
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Figure 8 shows that Saudi Arabia´s performance has varied, as measured by budget 
surplus/deficit as a percentage of GDP. In 2014, they had a budget deficit of -2.3% of GDP 
(SAMA, 2015). It is interesting to see that Saudi-Arabia has experienced a situation similar 
as today, with large budget deficits measured as a fraction of GDP. During the oil-price 
collapse in the late 80s, Saudi-Arabia faced budget deficits up to 25% of GDP. During the 
80s Saudi Arabia reduced their production in order to stabilize the oil market, which turned 
out to be a unsuccessful strategy (Reuters, 2014). In a recent report, IMF prognoses a budget 
deficit of 19.5% of GDP in 2015 (IMF, 2015). This is less than what they faced in the 80s.  
 
Figure 8: Ratio of Deficit/Surplus to GDP (%)  (SAMA, 2015) 
Another important issue is the public debt in Saudi-Arabia. Figure 9 shows the development 
of public debt. In brief, Saudi Arabia per today has a small fraction of public debt. By the 
end of 2014 the Kingdom had public debt of USD11.8bn. (SAMA, 2015). This was a debt to 
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debt with USD110.8 bn., and in 2004 they had a debt to GDP ratio of 37.3%.  
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Figure 9: Public debt, amount and % of GDP (SAMA, 2015) 
It is important to look at how they choose their oil policy. The best way is to separate short-
term and long term policy. Saudi Arabian short term oil policy is shaped by a trade-off 
between volume and revenues. The essential here is to adjust output and signalling to the 
market in the short term (Fattouh & Sen, The Oxford Institute For Energy Studies, 2015). 
The long term policy will be determined by the kingdom´s reserves, the high reliance on oil 
revenues and the difficulties of diversifying the economy away from oil. For instance, their 
goal is to balance the need for domestic consumption and ability to affect the oil markets. As 
earlier mentioned, Saudi Arabia has experienced a significant increase in domestic 
consumption of refined products. Their long term investment and output policy is therefore 
depending on balancing the need for spare capacity and to be able to meet domestic demand. 
If they fail to do so, a low spare capacity will for instance reduce their ability to calm oil 
markets, while a failure to meet domestic demand for oil will decrease their economic 
growth. This will also affect their long term investments in new reserves (Fattouh & Sen, 
The Oxford Institute For Energy Studies, 2015).  
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2.1.2 SAMA Foreign Holdings 
SAMA Foreign Holdings is the sovereign wealth fund of Saudi Arabia. The fund manages 
the Saudi Arabian foreign reserves that primarily come from oil revenue. As a fund, they are 
highly secretive regarding its holdings and investment strategies.  
Saudi Arabia established their fund SAMA Foreign Holdings in 1953. The fund managed a 
small amount of assets until 2005, when they started to invest more money into foreign 
securities (Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, 2015). According to the latest report from 
SAMA, SAMA Foreign Holdings had approximately USD745 bn. in foreign holdings in Q3-
14. This is up from USD100 bn. in 2005. In Q2-15, their foreign holdings have reduced with 
USD73 bn. from its peak in Q3-14 to total foreign holdings of USD672 bn.  
Their foreign holdings are composed of Monetary Gold, Special Drawing Rights (SDR), 
reserve positions in the IMF, foreign currency, deposits and investment in foreign securities 
(SAMA, 2015). You can see the quarterly change since 2005 in Figure 10 below.  
 
Figure 10: Quarterly change in foreign reserves (SAMA, 2015) 
We assume that changes in the fund comes from two sources: 1) return from the different 
investments and 2) inflow or outflow from their annual budget surplus/deficit.  
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Since SAMA do not share information regarding their fund, it is hard to find information 
regarding their investment strategy, asset allocation, returns and associated risks. We know 
however that it is a sovereign wealth fund.  This indicates that the fund, to some extent, will 
look similar to for instance the Norwegian Pension Fund Global run by Norges Bank 
Investment Management (NBIM). We will use their estimated expected return as a 
benchmark and proxy for the performance of SAMA´s fund in the future.  
2.2 Oil price development 
This paragraph describes the development in the oil price since 2014 until today, and gives a 
brief explanation of why the oil price has dropped. It is important to know the development 
in oil price and the reasons why we have experienced a drop in oil prices to get an overview 
of the situation Saudi Arabia is facing right now. 
In 2014, Brent oil price fell from USD108 per barrel to USD57 per Barrel. During the first 
six months of the year, the oil price remained stable within a USD10 per barrel range. The 
oil price reached its peak on June 19 reaching USD115.06 per barrel. Drastic fall 
characterized the following six months, and the price fell to USD57.33 per barrel on 
December 31 (EIA, 2015). The graph below shows the development in 2014:  
 
Figure 11: Development in crude oil prices for 2014 (EIA, 2015) 
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In 2015, the oil price has ranged between USD43 and USD67 per barrel, and seems to have 
stabilized at a low level.  
 
Figure 12: Development in crude oil prices for 2015 (EIA, 2015) 
There are different reasons for the drastic fall in the oil price. Both supply and demand 
factors have had impact on the drop in oil prices. According to U.S Energy Information 
Administration (EIA), the first part of the fall was an outcome of potential disruption in Iraq 
Oil Production and lowered economic growth expectations for 2014 and 2015. These factors 
brought the oil price down to about USD80 per barrel.  
There are additional factors that brought the oil price to an even lower level. According to 
EIA, increased U.S oil production and uncertainty over OPEC future production quotas 
explain most of this drop (EIA, 2015). U.S oil production has increased drastically the recent 
year, as an effect of the country’s ability to extract shale oil. Stable high oil prices in recent 
years have made it possible to develop new technology and shale oilfields in the US. This 
has led to an increase in the U.S production, which again have lowered their import of oil. 
The reduction in U.S import have had a direct effect on the global demand for oil. As can be 
seen in figure 1, the United States has increased their share of the world oil production.  
It has been argued that supply factors have played a larger role than demand factors in 
driving the oil prices down (Husain, Arezki, & Breuer, 2015).  Most of the OPEC-members 
face budget deficit when oil prices are as low as this. This could have been avoided if they 
reduced their supply in order to keep the oil prices at a higher level. However, this is not 
something OPEC, with Saudi Arabia as a major player did. Following the decision by OPEC 
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in late November not to curtail oil production, which took markets by surprise, prices fell 
quickly by about 20% as markets fundamentally changed expectations about future OPEC 
supply (Husain, Arezki, & Breuer, 2015). 
In March 2015, The Saudi Arabian oil minister Ali al-Nami commented on the fact that 
OPEC did not cut their supply of oil in November 2014. He stated, “Saudi Arabian quest for 
market share is simply an effort to satisfy rising customer demand. We seek calm markets, 
because this benefits everyone” (Ferro, 2015). This indicates that Saudi Arabia is interested 
in maintaining their market share. He further says, “Today, it is not the role of Saudi Arabia, 
or certain other OPEC nations, to subsidize higher cost producers by ceding market share” 
(Ferro, 2015). This statement indicates that Saudi Arabia is not interested in reducing 
production and increase the oil price, thus subsidies for instance US shale oil companies. To 
summarize, Saudi Arabia is willing to face the consequences of a low oil price in order to 
maintain their market share and power, and outcompete high cost oil companies that will not 
be able to endure today’s oil prices. 
2.3 Oil price theory 
To get an overview of the future oil price and be able to use reasonable estimates in our 
model, it is vital to see how theory explains the pricing of oil.    
Oil price theory builds on the assumptions that rational actors try to take advantage of 
imbalanced markets in order to gain profits. Different oil-related assets such as oil futures, 
shares of oil companies and oil reserves is used in oil market speculation (Knittel & Pindyck, 
2013). Of these assets, we will focus on storage arbitrage and the role of future contracts, 
along with price elasticity. Price elasticity is a measure of the relationship between a change 
in demand of a commodity and the change in its price. In this section, we will discuss the 
three factors that plays a central role in the oil price development. James D. Hamilton has 
analysed all these factors in a paper published in the “The Energy Journal, International 
Association for Energy Economics”, and we will use this paper as a basis.  
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2.3.1 Storage Arbitrage 
Storage arbitrage relates to an investor´s choice of either buying today or in the future. If 
there is an expectation that the price will increase in the future and become higher than 
today’s price plus storage costs, there is an expected profit with buying today, storing the oil 
and selling in the future. The outcome of this is that the demand for oil today will increase, 
and the prices will push upwards. At the same time, the fact that many investors have bought 
today in order to sell in the future will create an expectation of a supply surplus in the future. 
The effect of this is sales pressure and a followed price reduction. Investors will exploit the 
mismatch in the market until there is equilibrium between today’s price and expected price 
in the future. Formally, you can write this as (Hamilton, 2008):   
1)       𝐸! 𝑃! + 1 =   𝑃! + 𝐶!∗   
Et (Pt+1) is todays expectation for the price one period ahead, Pt is todays price and Ct* is the 
storage costs (including interest rate) for a period. It is worth mentioning that we are talking 
about speculating and not arbitrage, as the future price is based on expectations and is not 
certain.  
The theory of storage arbitrage implies that the oil price is forward-looking. This means that 
all information regarding an expected future oil price is already priced in today’s spot price.  
A change in the oil price will only occur in the event of new information, which also changes 
the expectations of the future prices. If we are facing an efficient oil market, the oil price 
development will be impossible to predict, as all the information is already priced. Based on 
this, one can argue that the oil price follows a random walk, where the best prediction of a 
future oil price is today’s oil price, for all periods of time (Hamilton, 2008). 
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2.3.2 Futures Markets 
This theory addresses the possibilities of buying future contracts on oil, and that there have 
to be equilibrium between expected future price and the futures price for the same period. As 
in the case of storage, arbitrage investors will try to take advantage of any disequilibrium. If 
today’s futures price for a period ahead is lower than the expected spot price for a period 
ahead, the demand for futures will increase. The reasoning for this is that investors want to 
buy cheap today and sell expensive in one period. This behaviour will lead to an expectation 
of supply surplus a period ahead, and therefore reduces the expectations of the future spot 
price. There has to be equilibrium, and this is can be written as (Hamilton, 2008):  
2)      𝐹! = 𝐸! 𝑃!!! + 𝐻!∗ 
Ft is today’s futures price with delivery in one period, Et (Pt+1) is today’s expectation on the 
spot price in one period and Ht* is a form of risk premium. This is also speculation and not 
arbitrage, since it builds on expectations.  
Equilibrium involves that the futures prices to large extent follows the spot price. Therefore, 
the futures price will also be forward-looking and reflect all the available information. By 
putting equation 1) and 2) together, you can see that the futures price should equal to the spot 
price (plus storage cost and risk premium). If you ignore Ct* and Ht* the equation will be 
(Hamilton, 2008):  
3)       𝑆! = 𝐹! 
The spot price should therefore be equal to the futures price with delivery in one day. This 
seems to be consistent with the reality. The variables correlate to large extent, and there are 
only small differences. These differences are most likely caused by Ct* and/or Ht*. However, 
futures tend to react less on news the further out in time the delivery is (Hamilton, 2008).  
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2.3.3 Price Elasticity  
You can divide price elasticity into price elasticity of demand and price elasticity of supply. 
Since our thesis focus on Saudi Arabia and the supply-factors in the oil market, we will only 
discuss price elasticity of supply.  
Price elasticity of supply  
An oil producer wanting to increase its production can do this either by accelerating the 
extraction from an existing reserve or by finding a new oil field. It is obvious that finding a 
new field and starting production will take long time. Increased production from existing 
oilfields can only be done to some extent, as many of them usually are fully utilized 
(Hamilton, 2008). These factors indicated that price elasticity of supply should be low in the 
short term. This is consistent with the analysis done by Hamilton, which concludes with a 
low price elasticity of supply in the short run (Hamilton, 2008). In the long run, there is more 
production flexibility, and the price elasticity of supply evolves to be more elastic. This 
however, depends on the ability of the participants to adjust their production (Hamilton, 
2008). 
2.4 Future Oil price outlook: 
Predicting future oil price proves itself very difficult, as there are many determinates 
affecting the oil price and based on theory random walk can apply.   
It is interesting to see what key analysts and organizations predict for the future oil price. 
According to Regional Economic Outlook Report published by IMF, they expect the 2015 
oil price to be USD52, increasing gradually to about USD63 in 2020. According to the IMF 
there are considerable uncertainty surrounding these figures (IMF, 2015).  
Goldman Sachs has tried to project the future oil price, and they have estimated that the oil 
price will be USD65 in 2017 (Goldman Sachs, 2015). 
The Wall Street Journal also conducted a survey where they asked ten of the most reputable 
investment banks in the world on their oil price outlook. Most of the analyst predicted the oil 
price to stay in the USD53 – USD64 range when we enter 2017, and only three of the banks 
see the price rising above USD70 a barrel in 2016 (Wall Street Journal, 2015). 
  
24 
There are clearly uncertainties regarding the outlook of oil prices. However, it seems to be 
consensus that the oil price is expected to stay below USD80 in the near future. This is also 
confirmed when we look at the future curve for the oil price. As we can see in the figure 
below, the future curve indicates that the oil price will stay below USD65 in the nearest 
future:   
 
Figure 13: Futures Cure Oil Price (CME Group, 2015) 
To summarize, it seems that the oil price we will observe in the future will be between 
USD40 and USD80 in the coming years. This underlines the importance of the topic, as a 
change in Saudi Arabian oil policy might lead to changes in the estimated future spot prices. 
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3. Analysis 
We start by presenting what other analysts have done in their analyses. We then present our 
data set before we conduct three separate static analyses. We base the first analysis on the 
same assumption of what the other analysts have done. In analysis two, we want to see how 
the estimates change if we include expected return on the foreign reserves, and in analysis 
three, we run an analysis with 2015-budgeted expenditures. Furthermore, we discuss the 
probability of Saudi Arabia reducing their expenditures. In addition, we conduct an empirical 
analysis based on historical data, and predict the changes in reserves based on the oil price. 
We then summarize the results of the analyses and look at the differences. Lastly, we look at 
the possibility Saudi Arabia have to increase their revenue through reducing their 
production, based on price elasticity of supply.  
3.1 What have other analysts done? 
The drop in oil prices has led to a lot of attention lately, as it has had a large impact on the 
global economy. Since Saudi Arabia is a large participant in the oil market, and their 
decision affects the oil market, other analysts have tried to predict when Saudi Arabia will 
run out of money. They do this in order to give an indication of when, and if, they will adjust 
their current oil policy. 
In a recent report, IMF estimates that Saudi Arabia will run out of money within five years 
under current policies (IMF, 2015). They define running out of money as the time where 
gross government assets turn negative. Furthermore, the analysis assumes no fiscal 
adjustment (for instance, non-oil primary balance to non-oil GDP remains at the 2014-level) 
and government borrowing. It also assumes that deficit only draw on the reserve assets. 
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According to an article published at CNBC, Saudi Arabia will run out of money on August 
28 2018 (Welss, 2015). This analysis assumes current crude oil production and a crude oil 
price of USD40. Furthermore, it assumes no changes in macro-economic factors. We 
conclude based on the linearity of their graph, that they do not include future return on the 
reserves. The reason for this is that including return on their fund would lead to non-constant 
decline in reserves. Figure 14 shows the result of their analysis:  
 
Figure 14: Analysis done by CNBC (Welss, 2015) 
In an article published on dn.no, Pareto´s Trond Omdal estimates that Saudi Arabia lose 
USD10 bn. per month (Laustsen, 2015). He assumes a constant production level and an oil 
price of USD50. Since he finds a constant loss, we conclude that his figures do not consider 
return on their current financial assets. A quick calculation of our own shows that given 
these numbers Saudi Arabia will run out of money in the beginning of 2021.  
In the different analysis, we see the analysts predict that Saudi Arabia run out of money 
within a relatively short period. It seems that the analyses do not account for return on the 
foreign reserves. Saudi Arabia had USD672 bn. in foreign reserves in Q2-2015, and we 
believe that they are able to generate significant return per year. A 4% annual return yields 
USD27 bn., which is approximately 10% of their total revenue in 2014. In addition, neither 
analyses discusses the possibility and ability for Saudi Arabia to adjust their expenditures. 
These simplifications overestimate the time of when Saudi Arabia will run out of money. By 
including return and discussing the expenditures, we are able to provide a more 
comprehensive analysis on the topic.  
  
27 
3.2 Description of data set 
We base our analysis on published data from Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), 
which consist of historical data from 1969 to 2014. SAMA record the data on an annual 
basis and includes actual income, expenditures, surplus/deficit, oil- production and export. 
Furthermore, they divide revenues into oil-revenues and other revenues, and expenditures 
into current expenditures and capital expenditures. Oil-production and export are 
denominated in barrels per day.  
SAMA also publishes quarterly data on the Saudi Arabian foreign reserves. The latest 
published version consists of historical data from Q1 2005 to Q2 2015. As mentioned earlier, 
SAMA divides their reserve assets into five different categories, Monetary Gold, SDR, 
Reserve Position in the IMF, Foreign Currency and Deposits Abroad, Investment in Foreign 
Securities.  
All the data collected from SAMA is denominated in Saudi Arabian currency Saudi Riyals. 
Saudi Arabia peg their currency at an official rate of 3.75 against US dollar. We have used 
this exchange rate to change all the data into US dollars in our analyses.  
We have collected the historical oil price used in our analysis from U.S Energy Information 
Administration and OPEC. This includes annual, quarterly and daily oil prices. 
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3.3 Analysis 1: No return on foreign assets 
In this analysis, we want to find out when Saudi Arabia run out of money, if we do not 
account for return on their foreign reserves. We base this analysis on static data and use the 
same assumptions as the other analysts.  
3.3.1 Approach 
We have used 2014 figures for all static variables in the model. In 2014, Saudi Arabia had 
total expenditures of USD296 bn. In order to get quarterly figures, we divided this with 
equal portions into quarterly expenditures of USD74 bn.  Other income accounted for 
USD35.6 bn., which equals to USD8.9 bn. quarterly.  
We assume a constant financial structure, same level of production and no strategic changes. 
Saudi Arabia exported 2611 million barrels in 2014. This equals to 652.75 million barrels 
per quarter, or 7.15 million barrels per day. We multiply this with the given oil prices in 
order to estimate their oil revenue.  
Furthermore, we have assumed no return on their fund and that deficit draw on reserve 
assets, which accounted to USD672 bn. in Q2 2015.  
We only adjust the income through different oil prices, and use different oil prices for 
different scenarios. As described in the theory part it is hard to predict what oil price we will 
observe in the coming years, and running scenarios covers different prices and gives us a fair 
estimate. The oil prices we use are USD40, USD50, USD60, USD70 and USD80 
respectively. These oil prices reflect what is believed to be the most likely oil prices in the 
future. With basis in the different oil prices, we are able to calculate the different 
inflows/outflows in the fund for each quarter. 
We use the following equation to estimate change in reserves:  
∆  𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 = 𝑂𝑖𝑙  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒  𝑥  𝑂𝑖𝑙  𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 + 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟  𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 − 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠!"#$ 
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3.3.2 Results 
The graph below shows the results based on the given scenarios: 
 
Figure 15: Results from analysis 1. Assuming no return on fund and 
Expenditures, other income and oil-export kept at 2014-level. 
We observe that Saudi Arabia will run out of money in the second half of 2019 if the oil 
price is USD40 and during Q3-2020 if the oil price is USD50. Adjusting the oil price to 
USD60 or USD70, delays the time when Saudi Arabia run out of money to late 2021 and 
late 2023. We observe that this analysis corresponds to what the other analysts have done.  
In this analysis, we estimate the break-even to be USD100. At this oil price, Saudi Arabia 
will not experience any changes in their foreign reserves.  
The model is a simplification and have some weaknesses. One of these weaknesses is that 
they leave expected return out of the equation. The effect of this is that it gives a simple 
linear decrease in their reserves and they exclude a factor that potentially can be a large 
fraction of their total revenues.  
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3.4 Analysis 2: Static analysis with return 
In this analysis, we want to see how the result changes if we include expected return on their 
foreign reserves. The return of the fund will affect the value of the fund and will therefore be 
crucial for how long it will take Saudi Arabia to run out of money. 
3.4.1 Approach 
In order to estimate the return of their fund we use the expected return for NBIM as a proxy. 
NBIM has an annual expected return of 4% (Norges Bank Investment Management, 2015), 
which is equal to 0.99% on a quarterly basis.  
We use the following equation to estimate change in reserves:  
∆  𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 = (𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠!!!𝑥  (1 + 𝐸 𝑟 !)) + 𝑂𝑖𝑙  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒  𝑥  𝑂𝑖𝑙  𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 + 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟  𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒− 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠!"#$ 
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3.4.2 Results 
The graph below shows the results of when Saudi Arabia will run out of money, given an 
expected return on their foreign reserves:  
 
Figure 16: Results from analysis 2. Expenditures, other income and oil-export 
kept at 2014-level. 4 % expected return on foreign reserve.  
We observe that we no longer have a linear reduction in reserves. We notice a higher effect 
of compound interest for higher oil prices. This implies that the effect of including return 
increases exponentially as the budget deficit decreases. Furthermore, the significance of the 
return decreases at lower oil prices, in comparison to the previous analysis. By including the 
return, we delay when Saudi Arabia run out of money by six months at oil price of USD40, 
compared to two years at oil price of USD70. 
In the scenario where we use USD40 as the future oil price, we observe that the quarterly 
outflow from their reserves will be approximately USD38.9 bn. If this is the case, Saudi 
Arabia will run out of money during Q1-20, just over four years from now.  
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With a constant oil price of USD50, the quarterly outflow from their reserves is slightly 
lower, approximately USD32.4 bn. With this oil price, we estimate that Saudi Arabia will 
run out of money during Q2-21, just over five years from now.   
An oil price of USD60 reduces the quarterly outflow from the foreign reserves to 
approximately USD24.6 bn. With this quarterly outflow, we estimate that Saudi Arabia will 
run out of money during Q1-23, under seven years from now.  
In the scenario with an oil price of USD70, we get a quarterly outflow of USD17.8 bn. With 
this oil price, Saudi Arabia will run out of money in the beginning of Q1-26.  
The last scenario we run, is a scenario where the oil price is USD80. This oil price reduces 
the quarterly outflow to USD11 bn. on a quarterly basis. This will affect their reserves, but it 
will take a long time before they run out of money. We estimate that they will run out of 
reserves late in 2038.   
In this analysis, we find a break-even oil price of USD89.6. We observe a significantly lower 
break-even compared to the break-even we find in analysis 1. By including a 4% expected 
return, we reduce the break-even by 10.4%. 
The static analysis gives a good indication on how long Saudi Arabia can withstand the 
different oil prices. In addition, it confirms that including return on their foreign assets 
delays the time when Saudi Arabia will run out of money, and that the other analysts 
overestimate their prognosis. 
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3.4.3 Weaknesses with the analysis 
Our analysis builds on the assumption that there will be no changes in the variables. We find 
it unlikely that the figures will stay the same for the next 5-10 years. The question is to what 
extent the variables will change and how this will affect our results.  
Export 
As we saw in figure 2, the export has been relatively constant for the past 20 years. In 
addition, Saudi Arabian officials have stated that they will keep the same production level in 
the coming years. Therefore, we find it unlikely that we will observe drastic changes in this 
variable. However, we have already seen that the average export level for Q1 2015 and Q2 
2015 has increased to 675 million barrels each quarter, in comparison to 652 million barrels 
in Q4 2014. These increases do not have a significant impact on our model, as it pushes the 
timeline by a quarter.   
Other revenue 
If we look at historical numbers, we see that the average annual increase in “other revenue” 
have been 6.13% over the past 34 years. This indicates that “other revenue” most likely will 
increase in the future. However, the variable consists of a small fraction of total revenue, and 
will therefore not have a significant impact on the results.  
Funds return 
We believe it is fair to say that the most reasonable estimate of the Saudi Arabian wealth 
fund’s return is similar to the expected return as the Norwegian pension fund. It is mentioned 
in an article by Reuters that Saudi Arabia has a very conservative approach on their fund and 
it is speculated that most of their assets are in treasury bonds (Reuters, 2014). NBIM has a 
60/40 ratio in equity and bonds, whereas 70% of the bonds are treasury bonds. We therefore 
believe this is a fair proxy to use. We also assume in our model that Saudi Arabia will be 
able to withdraw assets on a quarterly basis. This might be questionable as a fund of this size 
will probably be illiquid to some extent.  
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Expenditures 
Keeping expenditures constant is a strict assumption. Their expenditures have more than 
quadrupled from USD75 bn. in 2004 to USD296 bn. in 2014, which indicates that we might 
observe increased expenditures in the future. However, we can see in figure 5 that the 
expenditures correlate with revenues and it seems that the expenditures have increased as an 
effect of higher revenues. If this trend continues, expenditures will decline as an effect of 
reduced revenues. Other factors such as population growth can also lead to an increase in 
expenditures, which is not accounted for in our model. Overall, there is high uncertainty 
regarding the expenditures and this variable will deviate the most in our model.  
Debt 
We assume in our model that they are not able to finance their budget deficit with debt. This 
is a simplification as Saudi Arabia can use debt as a measure to finance their budget deficits, 
and might temporary delay a situation where they run out of money. In regards of our 
research question, our perspective is that they run out of money when their net financial 
assets equals to zero. In other words, they will be out of money if their public debt equals 
their foreign reserves.  
Overall, our model has some weaknesses. Despite this, we believe that the model is valuable 
for understanding the situation Saudi Arabia is facing, as it gives a fair estimate to when they 
will run out of money.  
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3.5 Analysis 3: Static analysis with 2015 budgeted 
expenditures 
Due to large uncertainty regarding the expenditures, we want to figure out when Saudi 
Arabia run out of money if they manage to stick to their budgets. 
3.5.1 Approach 
We base this analysis on the same assumptions as the previous analysis, but change the 
expenditure according to their budget for 2015. In 2015, Saudi Arabia have budgeted with 
expenditures of USD229 bn. 
We use the following equation to estimate change in reserves:  
∆  𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 = (𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠!!!𝑥  (1 + 𝐸 𝑟 !)) + 𝑂𝑖𝑙  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒  𝑥  𝑂𝑖𝑙  𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 + 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟  𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒− 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠!"#$! 
3.5.2 Results: 
The graph below illustrates the effect of using 2015-budgeted expenditure:   
 
Figure 17: Scenario analysis 2. 2015-budgeted expenditures and 4% expected 
return on foreign reserves. 
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The change in expenditures pushes the time when Saudi Arabia will run out of money back 
substantially. An oil price of USD40 pushes the time back with approximately five years, 
from Q1-20 to Q2-25. We also observe that an oil price of USD50 pushes the time from Q2-
21 to Q2-29, approximately eight years. We observe a substantial change in break-even, 
when we use budgeted expenditures for 2015 in our model. The break-even is reduced from 
USD89.6 to USD64.  
The findings in this analysis illustrates that by introducing a stricter budget policy, Saudi 
Arabia decreases the possibility of running out money significantly.   
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3.6 Change in Expenditures  
We want to estimate how much the expenditures have to change in order to reach a 
breakeven equal to the oil price. Furthermore, we want to discuss if it is realistic or not. We 
believe that the Saudi Arabian ability to adjust their expenditures to the decreasing revenues 
will affect their future oil policy.  
3.6.1 Estimations 
We base the calculations on the same assumptions as in analysis 2. We estimate the required 
cut in expenditures in order to reach a state where inflow/outflow will be equal to the 
expected return on the fund. ∆  𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 = 0 , and we solve the following equation for 
expenditures based on different oil price scenarios.  
  ∆  𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 = (𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠!!!𝑥  (1 + 𝐸 𝑟 !)) + 𝑂𝑖𝑙  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒  𝑥  𝑂𝑖𝑙  𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 + 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟  𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 − 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠! 
The following figures shows the results:  
 
Figure 18: Actual and budgeted expenses vs needed expenses 
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Figure 19: Actual and budgeted expenses vs needed expenses and cuts 
We observe that Saudi Arabia need to cut between USD51bn to USD129bn in annual 
expenditure in order for the reserves to remain at the same level in the coming years. The 
needed cuts in expenditures amounts to between 17% and 44% of their 2014 expenditures.  
In the case of an oil-price of USD40 and USD50, Saudi Arabia need to reduce their 
expenditures by USD63 bn. and USD37 bn., compared to their 2015 budgets. In the case of 
an oil-price of USD60 Saudi Arabia only need to reduce the costs by USD 11bn under what 
they have budgeted for 2015. If the oil price stays over USD70, they can exceed their 
budgets with approximately USD16 bn.  
3.6.2 Likelihood 
The estimated cuts in expenditures are large when you look at them isolated. This especially 
account for the scenarios where we have an oil price of USD40 and USD50. However, we 
observe that the necessary cuts needed in expenditures leads to a situation close to what they 
have budgeted.  
One can question Saudi Arabia´s ability to stick to their budgets. As we saw in figure 7, 
Saudi Arabia has exceeded their budgeted expenses every year since 2004. However, we do 
not believe that Saudi Arabia is uneducated in budgeting and that they miscalculated their 
budgets by 20-40% (Appendix 2) during the past ten years. The fact that they from 1980-
2000 were able to stick to their budgets supports this. We believe they have exceeded their 
budgets deliberately as an effect of increased revenue. In previous years, it seems that they 
used a very conservative approach to their oil price estimates (approximately USD70 per 
barrel for 2014). We believe that if the oil price exceeds their expectations, hence a higher 
revenue than expected, they realise that they are able to take on more expenditures than 
budgeted. This explains why they have had such a noticeable deviation in the budget for the 
past ten years, because the oil revenue has exceeded their expectations by 71% (Appendix 3) 
Figures	  in	  USD USD70 USD60 USD50 USD40
Expenditures	  2014 295	  974	  	  	  	  	  	  	   295	  974	  	  	  	  	  	  	   295	  974	  	  	  	  	  	  	   295	  974	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Expenditures	  needed 244	  915	  	  	  	  	  	  	   218	  804	  	  	  	  	  	  	   192	  694	  	  	  	  	  	  	   166	  584	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2015-­‐Budget 229	  333	  	  	  	  	  	  	   229	  333	  	  	  	  	  	  	   229	  333	  	  	  	  	  	  	   229	  333	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Difference	  from	  2014-­‐expenditures 51	  060	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   77	  170	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   103	  280	  	  	  	  	  	  	   129	  390	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Difference	  from	  2015-­‐budget 15	  581-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   10	  529	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   36	  639	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   62	  749	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
%	  Reduction 17	  % 26	  % 35	  % 44	  %
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on average. The graph in figure 6 supports this, as we can clearly see a correlation between 
revenues and expenditures, implying that they adjust their expenditures according to their 
revenues.  
These findings imply that Saudi Arabia has to be more consequent in their decisions 
regarding their expenditures and to greater extent stick to their budget. We believe this is 
likely to happen. The fact that Saudi Arabia has budgeted with an increase in their 
expenditures of 0.58% for 2015 supports this. This is a minor change compared to the past 
ten years, where they have increased the budgeted expenditures by 14% annually (SAMA 
2014). According to a recent published article in Financial Times, Saudi Arabian officials 
are working on a more sustainable strategy to curtail spending. Part of this strategy is to 
delay infrastructure projects, such as the Riyadh underground, and enforcing a spending 
squeeze across government departments (Kerr, Khalaf, & Barber, Financial Times, 2015). 
We are in other words witnessing that Saudi Arabia are implementing measures to decrease 
their expenditures and follow a stricter budget policy. 
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3.7 Analysis 4: Empirical analysis 
In this analysis we want to find out if the oil price can explain the inflow/outflow in foreign 
reserves, and whether this can be used to predict when Saudi Arabia run out of money. The 
empirical analysis is based on historical data and reflects what Saudi Arabia have done in the 
past. Therefore, this analysis will correct for the uncertainty regarding the future outlook of 
the variables in our static analyses, and will supplement these analyses by introducing a 
more dynamic aspect.  
3.7.1 Approach 
We believe that the oil price can be used to explain the changes in the foreign reserves, 
because the reserves consist of excess return from oil revenue. Therefore, we run an 
empirical analysis with the intention of finding a correlation between the dependent variable 
“changes-in-reserves” and the independent variable “Oil-Price”. 
We control the variables for stationarity by using a Dicky Fuller’s test, in order to avoid 
spurious results. We then look at the residuals for our regression and check for 
autocorrelation, and control for efficiency of our regression.  
Lastly, we summarize our results and calculate when they will run out of money based on 
different scenarios.  
3.7.2 Empirical strategy 
We use quarterly data from Q1-2005 to Q2-2015, which consist of 42 observations. This 
implies that we do not have any measurement errors or sample error, as we are looking at 
actual data and not a sample. Furthermore, we control that the variables are stationary before 
we run the regression. A variable is non-stationary if the variables have means, variance and 
covariance that change over time, and are unpredictable and useless for modelling. The 
result will be spurious if the variables are non-stationary.  
There are several ways to define a non-stationary variable: we have used the (AR1) for both 
our variables, which implies random walk with a non-zero drift, formally written as:  𝑌! =   α  + β ∗ 𝑦!!!   +   ε!   
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There are two reasons why we use drift for “change-in-reserves”. The main reason is that 
Saudi Arabia in the past ten years have had a constant increase in expenditures, which causes 
a negative drift for our variable. The second reason is due to the return of the fund. As the 
fund increases, the return increases additionally as an effect of compound interest, resulting 
in a larger change in returns for period 𝑡 + 1 than in period  𝑡. This results in a positive drift 
in our regression. In regards of oil price, Hamilton finds it likely that the oil-price follows a 
random walk. The change in oil price from the period before cannot explain the change in 
the next period. This suggests a random walk with drift. We include a time variable in our 
regression in order to correct for drift in our variables.  
Furthermore, we do a Dickey Fuller test, by running a regression on the variable in period   𝑡 − 1  and see how it affects the variable in the period 𝑡. Based on AR1 we subtract 𝑌!!! on 
both sides of the equation, which leads to the following equation:    ∆  𝑌! = 𝑎  +   𝛽 ∗   𝑌!!! 
Where      𝛽 = 𝑦 − 1 
 
Our null hypothesis is that the variable is non-stationary, and we test if 𝛽 ≠ 0, 
consequently      𝑦 = 1. If we reject the null hypothesis, and 𝛽 = 0  ,we have stationary variable 
that follows a random walk. 
The results are as shown in Figure 17. We observe that both our variables are significant and 
we conclude that the variables are stationary correcting for drift.  
 
 
  
Figure 20: Dickey-Fuller test with drift 
Furthermore, we decided to use a level-level model because “change-in-reserves” has both 
positive and negative value, and therefor unapproachable for a log-log model. We believe 
that a level-level model would be the most intuitive model in comparison to a level-log 
Z-­‐value p-­‐value
Oil_Price -­‐2.51 0.0082
Changeinreserves -­‐2.53 0.0079
No.	  of	  obs 40
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model, because we are interested in knowing the numerical changes in reserves based on 
certain static oil price.  
Furthermore, there cannot be elements in the error term that vary with the explanatory and 
the explained variables. This may cause a biased estimate of the oil price coefficient. For 
instance, the fund managers’ ability to produce additional return would probably be a 
variable that affect the explained variable “Change-in-reserves”. However, this would 
doubtfully have any effect on the explanatory variable “Oil-price”, and therefore not cause a 
biased estimate of our coefficient. Another possibility would be the US dollar price, which 
have had a consistent historical correlation with the oil price (Holodny, 2014). It is 
questionable however if a change in US dollar will affect the change in reserves.  
It is in general difficult to know what other variables we should include in our regression. 
We could have run a kitchen sink regression, and find other independent variables that 
explains the variance in our dependent variable. However, most of the macro-figures that 
could possibly affect the “changes-in-reserves” is non-stationary, because they are seasonal 
and would not be valid in our regression.  
We conclude that we might miss some variables in our regression. We believe this will affect 
our results to some extent, and therefore consider this as a weakness in our model. 
In regards of the models efficiency, we first check the correlogram of the residuals. This is 
shown in the appendix 4 and shows that we are not facing an autocorrelation problem.  
We consequently ran a robust regression in order to correct for possible heteroscedasticity.  
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3.7.3 Results 
The figure below shows the result of the regression:  
 
Figure 21: Result of the regression 
We find a coefficient for oil price of 859.56. The variable “observations” is our time-variable 
and we find this coefficient to be -996.98.  Furthermore, we observe a constant of minus -34 
723.29. The coefficients are significant on a 1% level. In addition, we observe a high 
explanatory power of 71.75%. The equation is as follows:  𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 =   −34  723.29− 996.98 ∗ 𝑜𝑏𝑠 + 858.56 ∗ 𝑜𝑖𝑙_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒               
 
  
Coefficient Std.error t-­‐stat p-­‐value
Observations -­‐996.98*** 147.91 -­‐6.74 0.000
Oil_Price 859.56*** 122.65 7.01 0.000
_cons -­‐34723.29*** 8327.06 -­‐4.17 0.000
No.	  of	  obs 41
F-­‐test 29.61
R^2 0.7175
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We use this equation to calculate when they will run out of money.  The graph below shows 
the results: 
  
Figure 22: Scenario analysis based on the output from the regression 
analysis 
We observe that an oil price of USD40 lead to a situation where Saudi Arabia run out of 
money during Q4-2018. If the oil price is USD50 Saudi Arabia will experience the same 
during Q2-2019. Given an oil price of USD60 and USD70 the time is pushed back to Q2-
2021 and Q4-2022 respectively.  
We notice that the breakeven for Q3-2015 gives us an oil price of 90.3, which is nearly the 
same we get in analysis 2. What is interesting to see is that the breakeven increases by 
approximately 1% for every quarter. This makes sense, as this reflects the drift effect in our 
regression. The drift is primarily caused by the constant increase of expenditures, which is 
the reason why there is no proportional relationship between oil price and change in 
reserves. As an effect of this, our regression assumes that Saudi Arabia will continue with 
the same constant increase in expenditures. As the results shows, they will run out of money 
fairly fast with this development. The interpretation of this is that it is meaningless what 
Saudi Arabia does regarding their oil production as long as they continue to increase their 
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expenditures. The analysis shows that Saudi Arabia needs to adjust their expenditures to a 
sustainable level in the future.  
3.7.4 Weaknesses 
There are some weaknesses with our analysis. First of all, our dataset consists of only 41 
observations, something that can decrease the quality of the regression. The reason for the 
few observations is that Saudi Arabia started to build their foreign reserves in 2005.  
The main weakness in our analysis is that our dataset does not include a period where the 
changes in expenditures fluctuate with a zero-mean. The regression is built on data where 
Saudi Arabia has had an upswing, and do not include a period where expenditures decreases. 
The interpretation of this is that the drift variable is overestimated, and that our regression 
only predicts what will happen if they continue as they have the past ten years.  
We do not separate between the changes in fund coming from return and changes coming 
from inflow/outflow, as we did in the previous analysis. The reason for this is that the 
historical return is not public information. We could have used historical return for NBIM as 
a proxy, but we feel that the uncertainty whether this is consistent with the actual historical 
performance of the fund leads to errors in our regression. Nevertheless, our drift variable 
captures the effect of the fund’s return.   
It is reasonable to think that the inflow/outflow of the fund has some correlation to the 
change in debt. A weakness in our model is that we do not including debt in our model, 
which might cause an omitted variable bias. Figure 7 shows that they have decreased their 
debt constantly the past ten years, which implies that the variable does not have a constant 
mean. This is one of the requirement for stationary variables. We could have solved this 
issue by looking at the change in debt, which would give us a variable with a constant 
negative mean. This would have been acceptable if we blindly base this on the data we have. 
However, Saudi Arabia had close to zero debt in 2014, which implies that a future change in 
debt would not return to its negative mean, as they have no more debt to pay. Therefore, 
including the variable for change in debt would give us a spurious result.  
Another weakness is that the regression is run on a period where the surplus generated has 
been divided between repayment of debt and inflow into the fund. Saudi Arabia does no 
longer have any debt, which means that the surplus is no longer used to repay debt, but 
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exclusively generate inflow into their foreign reserves. This implies that our “Oil-price” 
coefficient is underestimated.  
Overall there are some weaknesses with the analysis, and we should interpret the results 
carefully.  
3.8 Summary of results  
Figure 18 summarises the results from the analyses. As we can see, the time when Saudi 
Arabia run out of money differ depending on the different assumptions. 
 
Figure 23: Summary of results 
In analysis 1, we assume no return on their foreign reserves and 2014-expenditures and 
export. Given these assumptions, we find that Saudi Arabia run out of money between Q4-
2019 and Q3-2028 
In analysis 2, we add a 4% expected return to the foreign reserves and find that Saudi Arabia 
will run out of money between Q1-2020 and Q4-2033. 
In analysis 3, we adjust the expenditures to 2015 budgeted expenditures and assume a 4% 
return on the foreign reserves. We find that Saudi Arabia run out of money between Q2-2025 
and Q3-2047, with an oil price between USD40 and USD60.  
In analysis 4, we use empirical methods and find that Saudi-Arabia run out of money 
between Q4-2018 and Q4-2022.  
  
Analysis	  1 Analysis	  2 Analysis	  3 Analysis	  4
Oilprice 2014-­‐	  Exp 4	  %	  Return	   2015-­‐Budget Empirical	  
USD	  40 Q4-­‐2019 Q1-­‐2020 Q2-­‐2025 Q4-­‐2018
USD	  50 Q3-­‐2020 Q2-­‐2021 Q2-­‐2029 Q2-­‐2019
USD	  60 Q4-­‐2021 Q1-­‐2023 Q3-­‐2047 Q2-­‐2020
USD	  70 Q1-­‐2024 Q1-­‐2026 -­‐ Q2-­‐2021
USD	  80 Q3-­‐2028 Q4-­‐2033 -­‐ Q4-­‐2022
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3.9 Will Saudi Arabia benefit from cutting their supply? 
One possible measure for Saudi Arabia is to cut their production in order to try to stabilize 
the markets. We want to figure out what Saudi Arabia can gain by reducing their oil 
production in order to stabilize the markets and get a higher oil price. Hamilton finds that the 
price elasticity of supply is low in the short run. In the long run, there is more production 
flexibility, and the price elasticity of supply is less inelastic (Hamilton, 2008). He points out 
that there are uncertainties regarding the exact number and emphasises that it is hard to 
measure. However, we use his findings, through scenarios of inelasticity, to calculate the 
effects of reducing their production. This analysis will give an indication on Saudi Arabian 
future production quotas.  
3.9.1 Approach 
We split the analysis in two parts. In the first part, we use different levels of elasticity, 0.1, 
0.2 and 0.3 respectively, to see the effect of lowering the supply. We assume that these levels 
of elasticity correspond to the low short-term elasticity, which Hamilton finds. We choose to 
use three different elasticity due to the uncertainty regarding the actual level. Given the 
different elasticity, we calculate how much OPEC has to cut in oil production in order to 
maximize their aggregated revenue. We assume that OPEC unify in order to cut the 
production and that the OPEC-countries are the only ones who change their current 
production.  
In order to extract the effect for Saudi Arabia, we divide the output from OPEC into 
proportional parts depending on the fraction of production each country has within OPEC. 
We have used production figures, expenditures and other income for 2014.  
In the second analysis, we choose different levels of production cuts. We have used cuts of 
10% and 20% and observe the effect when the elasticity is 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3 respectively. We 
do this to see the effect of cuts lower than the cuts that maximize their revenue, as it is likely 
to believe that production cuts will be done gradually. 
In both our analyses we separate between surplus and revenue. They might benefit by 
reducing their production level in form of increased revenue, but at the same time have a 
budget deficit. In addition, we assume no changes in demand in the analyses. 
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3.9.2 Results 
The graph below shows the result of the first analysis:  
 
Figure 24: Analysis showing necessary production cuts for OPEC and Saudi 
Arabia given low elasticity of supply 
We observe that the revenue per day increases in all the scenarios. This implies that Saudi 
Arabia has something to gain from cutting and optimizing their production as long as the 
elasticity is below 0.43. In the scenarios, their daily revenue increases to USD973M, 
USD606M and USD489M, up from USD427M. The elasticity of 0.43 equals the maximum 
level of elasticity where production cuts results in increased revenue.    
When looking at the surplus, we observe that the only scenario that gives a budget surplus is 
the scenario where the elasticity equals to 0.1. This gives a surplus of USD94.2 bn. In this 
scenario, OPEC have to cut their production with 38%, which correspond to a production cut 
of 12% by Saudi Arabia. The new observed oil price is USD113.9. In the scenarios with 
OPEC
Elasticity 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.43
Reduction	  in	  World	  Production 15.9	  % 10.9	  % 5.9	  % 0
Reduction	  OPEC	  Production 38.0	  % 26.1	  % 14.1	  % 0
%	  Change	  in	  price 159	  % 54	  % 20	  % 0
Oil	  price	  19-­‐11-­‐2015 44 44 44 44
New	  Oil	  Price 113.94 67.97 52.65 44
Revenue	  per	  day	  before 1	  350	  046	  	  	  	  	  	   1	  350	  052	  	  	  	  	  	   1	  350	  052	  	  	  	  	  	   1	  350	  052	  	  	  	  	  	  
Revenue	  per	  day	  after 2	  166	  273	  	  	  	  	  	   1	  541	  801	  	  	  	  	  	   1	  387	  480	  	  	  	  	  	   1	  350	  052	  	  	  	  	  	  
Saudi	  Arabia
Elasticity 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.43
Reduction	  in	  World	  Production 15.9	  % 10.9	  % 5.9	  % 0
Reduction	  Saudi	  Arabian	  Production 12.0	  % 8.3	  % 4.5	  % 0
%	  Change	  in	  price 159	  % 54	  % 20	  % 0
Oil	  price	  19-­‐11-­‐2015 44 44 44 44
New	  Oil	  Price 113.9 68.0 52.6 44
Revenue	  per	  day	  before 427	  359	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   427	  359	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   427	  359	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   427	  359	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Revenue	  per	  day	  after 973	  418	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   605	  690	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   488	  508	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   427	  359	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Annual	  Oil	  Revenue 355	  297	  629	  	   221	  076	  880	  	   178	  305	  304	  	   155	  985	  962	  	  
Other	  Income	  (2014	  level) 34	  939	  000	  	  	  	   34	  939	  000	  	  	  	   34	  939	  000	  	  	  	   34	  939	  000	  	  	  	  
Expenditures 295	  974	  000	  	   295	  974	  000	  	   295	  974	  000	  	   295	  974	  000	  	  
Surplus 94	  262	  629	  	  	  	   39	  958	  120-­‐	  	  	  	   82	  729	  696-­‐	  	  	  	   105	  049	  038-­‐	  	  
Elastisity
Elastisity
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elasticity of 0.2 and 0.3, the necessary cuts for Saudi-Arabia (OPEC) are 8.3% (26.1%) and 
4.5% (14.1%) respectively.  
The graph below shows the results from our second analysis: 
 
Figure 25: Analysis showing the effect of a 10% and 20% cut in OPEC 
production at different levels of elasticity of supply 
We also observe an increased revenue per day in this analysis, which indicates that Saudi 
Arabia has some to gain from reducing their production. However, we only observe surplus 
in the scenario where there is a 20% cut in OPEC production and an elasticity of 0.1. This 
cut correspond to a 6.3% cut in Saudi Arabian oil production and gives a new oil price of 
USD80.8.  
Both analyses show that Saudi Arabia will decrease their budget deficits, by adjusting their 
production and increasing their revenues. These findings indicate that this is a potential 
measure for Saudi Arabia. However, we observe that only two out of nine scenarios leads to 
a surplus. This indicates that exclusively adjusting their production might not be the 
sufficient solution for Saudi Arabia.   
Hamilton argues that the elasticity is low in the short run, but will increase in the longer run 
(Hamilton, 2008). The implications of this is that Saudi Arabia will benefit in the short term 
from reducing their supply. However, it may not be as beneficial for them in the long run, 
because we do not know whether the long term elasticity will increase above 0.43. Not 
OPEC 10	  %	  Cut 20	  %	  Cut 10	  %	  Cut 20	  %	  Cut 10	  %	  Cut 20	  %	  Cut
Elasticity 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
Reduction	  in	  World	  Production 4.2	  % 8.4	  % 4.2	  % 8.4	  % 4.2	  % 8.4	  %
Reduction	  OPEC	  Production 10.0	  % 20.0	  % 10.0	  % 20.0	  % 10.0	  % 20.0	  %
%	  Change	  in	  price 42	  % 84	  % 21	  % 42	  % 14	  % 28	  %
Oil	  price	  19-­‐11-­‐2015 44 44 44 44 44 44
New	  Oil	  Price 62.39 80.78 53.19 62.39 50.13 56.26
Revenue	  per	  day	  before 1	  350	  052	  	  	  	  	  	   1	  350	  052	  	  	  	  	  	   1	  350	  052	  	  	  	  	  	   1	  350	  052	  	  	  	  	  	   1	  350	  052	  	  	  	  	  	   1	  350	  052	  	  	  	  	  	  
Revenue	  per	  day	  after 1	  722	  828	  	  	  	  	  	   1	  982	  763	  	  	  	  	  	   1	  468	  937	  	  	  	  	  	   1	  531	  402	  	  	  	  	  	   1	  384	  307	  	  	  	  	  	   1	  380	  949	  	  	  	  	  	  
Saudi	  Arabia 10	  %	  Cut 20	  %	  Cut 10	  %	  Cut 20	  %	  Cut 10	  %	  Cut 20	  %	  Cut
Elasticity 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
Reduction	  in	  World	  Production 4.2	  % 8.4	  % 4.2	  % 8.4	  % 4.2	  % 8.4	  %
Reduction	  Saudi	  Arabian	  Production 3.2	  % 6.3	  % 3.2	  % 6.3	  % 3.2	  % 6.3	  %
%	  Change	  in	  price 42	  % 84	  % 21	  % 42	  % 14	  % 28	  %
Oil	  price	  19-­‐11-­‐2015 44 44 44 44 44 44
New	  Oil	  Price 62.4 80.8 53.2 62.4 50.1 56.3
Revenue	  per	  day	  before 427	  359	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   427	  359	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   427	  359	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   427	  359	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   427	  359	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   427	  359	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Revenue	  per	  day	  after 586	  775	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   734	  884	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   500	  303	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   567	  593	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   471	  479	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   511	  830	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Annual	  Oil	  Revenue 214	  172	  861	  	   268	  232	  679	  	   182	  610	  534	  	   207	  171	  565	  	   172	  089	  758	  	   186	  817	  861	  	  
Other	  Income	  (2014	  level) 34	  939	  000	  	  	  	   34	  939	  000	  	  	  	   34	  939	  000	  	  	  	   34	  939	  000	  	  	  	   34	  939	  000	  	  	  	   34	  939	  000	  	  	  	  
Expenditures 295	  974	  000	  	   295	  974	  000	  	   295	  974	  000	  	   295	  974	  000	  	   295	  974	  000	  	   295	  974	  000	  	  
Surplus 46	  862	  139-­‐	  	  	  	   7	  197	  679	  	  	  	  	  	   78	  424	  466-­‐	  	  	  	   53	  863	  435-­‐	  	  	  	   88	  945	  242-­‐	  	  	  	   74	  217	  139-­‐	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knowing the exact long term effect of cutting their production is a risk factor Saudi Arabia, 
may not be willing to take. 
Our findings indicate that there is uncertainty and risk associated with reducing the oil 
production. We observe that Saudi Arabia has the opportunity to reduce their oil production, 
as this will reduce their risk of running out of money and send a positive signal to the 
market. However, exclusively reducing their production do not solve the initial problem 
regarding running out of money. This implies that Saudi Arabia has to initiate additional 
measures. 
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4. Conclusion 
This thesis examines when and if Saudi Arabia will run out of money, and may give an 
indication on how Saudi Arabia will react to the low oil price. Their response will give an 
indication on how the oil market will develop, due to the large impact Saudi Arabia has on 
the global oil market. 
We find that Saudi Arabia will run out of money within a short period of time, if they make 
no financial or strategic adjustments, and continue as they have done in the past. This is 
consistent with what other analysts find. However, our findings differ from the other 
analyses since we include expected return to the foreign reserves. Including an expected 
return, delays the time when Saudi Arabia run out of money, which suggests that the other 
analysts overestimate when Saudi Arabia run out of money.  
Furthermore, we find that Saudi Arabia will decrease the possibility of running out of money 
as long as they introduce a stricter budget policy. Saudi Arabia has shown handling power by 
being conservative with their 2015-budget and initiating spending curtails. In addition, we 
believe, based on historical data, that Saudi Arabia have exceeded their budgets deliberately 
as an effect of higher revenues than expected. This suggests that Saudi Arabia will adjust 
their expenditures to the reduced revenues. 
There is a possibility that Saudi Arabia can avoid adjusting their expenditures by reducing 
their oil production, hence increase the oil price. This is consistent with what we find in our 
elasticity analysis, which shows that Saudi Arabia will likely benefit from cutting their oil 
production. However, the increase in revenue is hardly enough to solve their initial issue 
regarding running out money. The implication of this is that they must change their 
expenditure policy first, before initiating a production cut. This is also supported by our 
empirical analysis, which shows that the constant increase in expenditures is not sustainable 
over time, regardless of what the future oil price will be.  
We conclude that Saudi Arabia will not run out of money. They will acknowledge a 
persistent low oil price, adjust their expenditures relative to their revenue and tighten their 
budget policies. As a supplement, Saudi Arabia has the possibility to cut their production to 
some extent. However, we believe Saudi Arabia will try to delay this for as long as possible 
as part of their long term strategy, and avoid subsidizing high cost oil producers such as US 
  
52 
shale oil companies. As an effect of this, we will continue to observe over-supply of oil in 
the oil market, as it is unlikely that Saudi Arabia will change their oil production. Therefore, 
governments, businesses and individuals affected by the low oil price, have to adjust to 
today’s situation and prepare for a persisting low oil price. 
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6. Appendix 
 
 
Appendix 1: Marginal production cost 2014 (Knoema, 2015) 
 
Country Marginal	  production	  cost	  2014
Arctic 120.00
Onshore 18.00
Biodiesel 110.00
Ethanol 103.00
Canada Sand 90.00
Ethanol 66.00
Offshore 80.00
Deep-­‐water 57.00
Shale 73.00
Angola Offshore 40.00
Ecuador Total 20.00
Venezuela Total 20.00
Kazakhstan Total 16.00
Deep-­‐water 30.00
Onshore 15.00
Oman Total 15.00
Qatar Total 15.00
Iran Total 15.00
Algeria Total 15.00
UAE Total 7.00
Iraq Total 6.00
Saudi	  Arabia Onshore 3.00
Russia
Europe
Brazil
United	  States
Nigeria
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Appendix 2: Average overestimation of revenues 
 
Appendix 3: Average overestimation of expenditures 
 
Appendix 4: Correlogram of Residuals 
Revenue Actual Budgeted Diff
2005 150	  489	  	   74	  667	  	  	  	   102	  %
2006 179	  649	  	   104	  000	  	   73	  %
2007 171	  413	  	   106	  667	  	   61	  %
2008 293	  598	  	   120	  000	  	   145	  %
2009 135	  948	  	   109	  333	  	   24	  %
2010 197	  764	  	   125	  333	  	   58	  %
2011 298	  078	  	   144	  000	  	   107	  %
2012 332	  639	  	   187	  200	  	   78	  %
2013 308	  363	  	   221	  067	  	   39	  %
2014 278	  498	  	   228	  000	  	   22	  %
Average 71	  %
Expenditures Actual Budgeted Diff
2005 92	  393	  	  	  	   74	  667	  	  	  	   24	  %
2006 104	  886	  	   89	  333	  	  	  	   17	  %
2007 124	  333	  	   101	  333	  	   23	  %
2008 138	  685	  	   109	  333	  	   27	  %
2009 159	  049	  	   126	  667	  	   26	  %
2010 174	  369	  	   144	  000	  	   21	  %
2011 220	  453	  	   154	  667	  	   43	  %
2012 232	  881	  	   184	  000	  	   27	  %
2013 260	  270	  	   218	  667	  	   19	  %
2014 295	  974	  	   228	  000	  	   30	  %
Average 26	  %
